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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council o f the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas o f 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form o f Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most o f the 
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The Robert Schuman Centre’ s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development o f interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European 
Union in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of 
attention. The scope and style o f papers in the series is varied, however, two 
areas o f research have been prioritized:
1/The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices o f the Centre’ s Programme, as
well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute.
This paper was written within the project on The Eastward Enlargement o f the 
European Union: the Cases o f the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
which was set up by the Robert Schuman Centre through the support o f the 
Academy o f Finland. For information on this and other projects on Eastern 























































































































































































Eastern enlargement o f the European Union will create a new, the south-eastern, 
periphery o f the Union, a periphery which is partly situated close to the 
economic core. It has been shown (by Fischer, Sahay, Vegh 1998) that distance 
from the core, be it Brussels or Diisseldorf, is a factor strongly influencing 
economic convergence as it happened in Western Europe after World War II. 
Under normal conditions, countries like Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, and, o f 
course, Eastern Germany should be on a productivity level comparable to 
Western Germany, Austria, Italy, countries like Poland and Hungary on a level 
perhaps comparable to Spain. Such was the situation immediately before and 
after the war (Wagener 1999a). However, conditions in Eastern Europe were not 
normal - the region came under the hegemony o f the Soviet Union and it was 
forced to adopt the Soviet political and economic system. So it did not take part 
in the impetuous convergence process that has characterized economic 
development o f Western Europe for the last 50 years. The present productivity 
level is at best 50 per cent o f what it could have been. Eastern Europe moved 
away from Europe and Eastern Central Europe from the core o f it. 
Peripherisation is the result o f 50 years o f communism.
1 The paper has benefited from the discussion at the first session o f  the Reflection Group on 
Diversity and Unity in the Enlarged European Union. Helpful comments by Dr. Katharina 



























































































After the collapse o f Soviet hegemony and o f the Soviet-type system, the 
countries o f Eastern Central Europe (ECE) immediately declared their intent to 
"return to Europe" which means above all catching up with the post-war 
political and economic development. A  central feature o f the European 
economic and political system is the welfare state. Despite o f a great diversity in 
its institutional arrangements, there is a common commitment and there are 
shared values which allow to speak o f a European welfare state clearly to be 
distinguished from the Anglo-American and Japanese social cultures. With the 
abolition o f the market and private striving for profit as driving forces o f the 
economic system, the Soviet-type economy made social policy pointless - there 
was not any more an autonomous economic sphere whose working and results 
are to be regulated, complemented, or changed by political power. Hence, the 
communist welfare state, if there is such a thing (for let it be clear: a high share 
o f education and health services in final demand and an income distribution in 
favour o f the non-active or poorer parts o f the population do not make in 
themselves a welfare state), must be something completely different from the 
European welfare state even if social justice, one o f the shared values within the 
latter, was also one o f the catch words o f communism.
Return to Europe poses a double task for those who endeavour the 
journey: the transformation o f the political and economic system and the 
catching up o f productivity levels. Both are not independent o f each other. For 
as the theory o f conditional convergence (Barro, Sala-i-Martin 1992) suggests, 
convergence clubs are defined by their systemic properties. It is not undisputed, 
we have to admit, whether the European welfare state belongs to these essential 
properties. So it may be assumed that on their way back to Europe the countries 
o f ECE have more degrees o f freedom in this respect than in others where there 
is theoretical consensus and a well defined aquis communautaire.
Seen from the side o f the incumbent members o f the European Union, 
return to Europe o f the ECE countries is treated as eastern enlargement o f the 
Union, the most comprehensive enlargement project since 1973 when the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the Europe o f the Six. At that time basic 
conditions for accession have been formulated which, for the present case of 
eastern enlargement, have been re-stated at the Copenhagen summit. Next to the 
general conditions o f democratic rule o f law and a functioning market order, it is 
the aquis communautaire which erects the highest hurdle before the entrance to 
the Union. The Copenhagen conditions also mentioned competitiveness: the 
accession candidates should be able to put up with competition from the Union 





























































































It is generally thought that these conditions pose little problem in the 
context o f social security. While the Economic and Monetary Union (EM U) is a 
highly developed part o f the acquis (not in all its elements obligatory as 
membership o f the Euro-bloc shows), the European Union is not yet a social 
union and will not be so for the foreseeable future. Convergence o f social 
conditions will be the outcome o f economic convergence, it cannot be a 
precondition. Hence candidate countries are free to choose welfare regimes 
which they think appropriate for their stage o f development and their social 
culture. Some advisers recommend, and some critics fear, that ECE countries 
should orient themselves towards American flexibility and low key welfare 
provisions becoming thus model cases of growth and efficiency, or Trojan 
horses o f the race to the bottom o f welfare.
Even if the social acquis is not very comprehensive, however, it is not an 
empty set. It can be ascertained on four levels:
4 the level o f the single market with health and safety prescriptions,
4 the level o f the social protocol which has been incorporated in the 
Treaty o f Amsterdam with working time and equal opportunity 
regulations for instance,
*  the level o f social dialogue rules demanding social partnership e.g.,
4 and the level o f what is called the "soft aquis", i.e. some kind of 
European social culture that cannot be made binding for any 
candidate country, but which it is expected to share.
It is obvious that some o f the elements o f the social aquis imply costly 
investments on the side o f the less developed candidate countries. On the other 
side, competition by low wage and low social cost labour is a point o f concern in 
some incumbent member states.
On the following pages I will attempt to assess the measures taken to 
transform the social security system in the post-communist countries o f ECE. 
The guiding question should be whether by enlarging the European Union into 
this direction, the aquis in its broader meaning, not as a body o f legal 
regulations, but as an economic and social culture, comes under a threat. In the 
next chapter a brief survey o f the starting conditions, the communist welfare 
state, is given. Transformation o f the social security system can be divided into 
two phases which will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Some considerations 





























































































2. The Socialist Welfare State
It has become common to start reflections on the post-socialist welfare state with 
Kornai’ s (1995: 131) dictum that the Hungarian and, implicitly, the socialist 
welfare state in general was born "prematurely", i.e. the countries o f Eastern 
Europe introduced lavish welfare measures without the necessary economic 
basis or a corresponding high level o f GNP. This statement is in contrast to the 
received pre-1989 opinion that the socialist welfare state, as far as size and 
scope are concerned, is very much in line with western developments which 
could be taken as confirmation o f the at that time popular convergence 
hypothesis (Pryor 1968, Castles 1986, and also Gotting 1998: 77-80). Such 
inter-system comparisons suffer from several shortcomings: GNP comparisons 
are on a very shaky basis because o f price and quality problems, and the 
organisation o f the welfare state is so different that quantitative evaluation is 
almost impossible. A  second remark with respect to Kornai’ s dictum refers to 
the fact that development is not the only determinant o f welfare state size. 
Ideology, or shared opinions and values, is a second factor to the effect that also 
in the West continental ideas about social security differ from anglo-american 
ones. And ECE, already before the communist takeover, shared the continental 
tradition. Even on the European continent we find different levels o f welfare 
provision. The latecomers to social security, Sweden and The Netherlands e.g., 
have much more comprehensive systems than, say, Germany and Austria. Also 
in the East commitment to social security and equality differed in the pre­
communist as well as in the communist period, Czechoslovakia cared more for 
both than Poland for instance.
Be that as it may. I f  not lavish - there was nothing lavish under 
communism, even not the fringe benefits o f its ruling class - the socialist welfare 
state was comprehensive and sizeable. However, it was a worker’ s privilege, not 
a citizen’s right. In daily life the difference was minimal, since almost 
everybody was a worker. Those who were not, but were working people, got 
incorporated into the socialist welfare state rather lately and under special 
conditions: kolkhozniki in the Soviet Union, private farmers in Poland, private 
small scale entrepreneurs in the GDR. The close link between social security 
provisions and the worker status derives from the first and foremost property o f 
the socialist welfare state - full employment. The full employment guarantee 
was made possible by the specific role o f the firm in the socialist system, not 
being primarily an economic unit, but a social one. Without any competitive 
pressure and with a state guarantee o f existence, the state-owned enterprise 
could provide any wished-for employment and take over many tasks o f the 
social security system. Since, as a rule, these firms were big, they had a regional 
function and could adopt local administrative tasks which otherwise would rest 




























































































short-cut was the practice o f price subsidies which, by the way, makes the 
calculation o f the size o f the socialist welfare state so cumbersome. By fixing 
only symbolic prices for the necessities o f daily life, food, clothing, housing, 
public transport, the socialist welfare state was convinced to have solved the 
problem o f poverty and did not need any carefully designed targeted measures.
Technically, the formerly independent social insurances - in ECE more or 
less closely following the Bismarckian model - were incorporated in the state 
budget and state administration. The firms were paying the workers’ 
contributions into the budget and they, or more precisely the enterprise 
organisation o f the trade union, were administering the claims o f their workers. 
Pensions were rather small, thus inducing an additional labour supply, and they 
had the special problem o f hidden inflation: the older a pension claim, the 
smaller its real value. Health care was directly provided by the state. A 
statistically comprehensive provision suffered from low quality and 
underfinancing which led to the wide-spread practice o f side-payments by the 
clients in order to get proper and timely treatment. Education was the pride o f 
communism. In short, economics and politics and, in our case, economic policy 
and social policy were not separated from each other. The workers stood under 
the protective guarantee o f a paternalistic state. They were free o f any 
responsibility, life was organised in all its aspects - the nightmare o f any liberal 
critic o f the welfare state.
Obviously, this system could not be carried on once transformation from 
socialist planning to capitalist markets had come on the agenda. Nevertheless it 
is common knowledge that transformation o f the social security system was not 
among the priority objectives o f reform policy and could be treated as second 
order phenomenon (Ringold 1999, Wagener 1999b). This needs a brief 
explanation. Indeed, the transformation programs preferentially aimed at 
stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and when the objective "institution 
building" was made concrete, it was the introduction o f a functioning banking 
system and capital markets that got pride o f place. Implicitly it was thought that 
the new economic regime had inherited an operating social security system from 
the old regime about which it could care when the priority objectives had been 
dealt with. Typically, Leszek Balcerowicz’ s (1995) account o f the Polish 
transformation process does not mention the terms social security and welfare in 
its index nor do they show up in the text. In the early 1990s they were not 
important, although, especially in Poland, they became so very soon. As a matter 
o f fact, stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation changed thoroughly the 
inherited social security system. For all this was about the separation o f 





























































































Liberalisation had two effects. It separated the firm from the state and 
made it an independent economic unit with (more or less) hard budget 
constraints. In order to survive in the market, firms, even i f  they still were state- 
owned, had to cut all costs which were not necessary with respect to commercial 
production. Overstaffing was reduced immediately and unnecessary social 
provisions were relinquished. Transition to the new system may have been eased 
by some budget subsidies or soft bank credits, especially for big old firms. But 
stabilisation puts limits to such softening measures, since they inevitably have 
inflationary consequences. As a result, unemployment was unavoidable and 
unemployment benefits became an immediate necessity. At the same time, the 
decline o f formal sector employment reduced the revenues o f the social security 
system. This decline was not uniform all over the region. While in the Czech 
Republic the lowest level (1989 = 100) was reached at 89.7, in Hungary the 
corresponding figure was 69.8 (UN-ECE 2000: 228). It is easy to imagine that 
the strain on the welfare state was much more serious in Hungary than in the 
Czech Republic. Further, certain social services, up to then provided by the firm, 
either got outsourced or disappeared altogether. Effective privatisation 
reinforced this tendency. The second effect o f liberalisation was the freeing o f 
prices which, together with stabilisation, also meant the discontinuation o f price 
subsidies for life ’ s necessities. Where nominal wages or transfer payments were 
inflexible, real incomes must have dropped, occasionally under the poverty line. 
At the same time, the pension, health and education systems could be continued 
for the time being in a more or less unreformed way transferring only the 
administrative tasks from the firm to the state which did not have the appropriate 
administration to start with. Social policy, above all the pension system, has 
been used in the first phase o f transformation to cushion or to compensate for 
the immediate social consequences o f the transition crisis (see Offe 1993). The 
crisis being an unexpected phenomenon, governments may have worked under 
the assumption that the rather rapidly increasing costs o f such measures to the 
social security system would be o f a transitory nature. Only when and where it 
turned out that this is not the case, fiscal problems moved social policy centre 
stage. So we conclude that unemployment benefits, social compensation, and the 
technical administration o f welfare benefits were o f first phase transformation 
concern, while the basic models got on the agenda not before the second phase.
3. Transformation of the Welfare State
Transformation o f the welfare state has an important preliminary stage: 
transformation o f the state. This is by no means a trivial affair. The old 
communist state crumbled throughout the region. Transformation o f the 
political, economic, and social systems could only be accomplished under the 
guidance o f a strong state. The solution o f this conundrum was at the roots o f 




























































































crisis, resumed economic growth and accomplished in-depth structural changes. 
These countries have comparatively well established democracies and effective 
governments; they are typically to be found in Eastern Central Europe. Less 
successful transformers did not overcome the initial crisis and slid into a 
protracted depression. In these countries state governance is weak, very often 
captured by particular interests, and unable to perform its normal functions; they 
are typically to be found in the Former Soviet Union, Russia and the Ukraine 
being the most spectacular cases. As a result these countries are situated in a 
kind o f limbo: the state is weak and poor and cannot live up to the expectations 
o f the population. Compensatory social policy as reaction to the transition crisis 
is out o f question. The firms, albeit privatised, are not thoroughly restructured 
and operate in what has been called a "virtual economy" (Gaddy and Ickes 
1998). Workers are staying with their old firm even if they do not get payed, 
since certain welfare provisions, housing for instance, are still offered. For the 
rest, the citizens have to look after themselves which means that large strata fall 
into poverty. It is typical for the FSU countries that poverty has increased 
significantly during the 1990s, while in ECE this happened only moderately: the 
incidence o f poverty increased between the periods 1987-8 and 1993-5 in 
Hungary from 1 to 7 per cent o f the population, in Poland from 6 to 10 per cent, 
in Estonia from 1 to 34 per cent, in Romania 6 to 48 per cent, and in Russia 2 to 
39 per cent (Milanovic 1998: 77; the figures may be disputed, the trend is 
unquestionable). The inequality measures show similar developments (ibid.: 41). 
This is not the place to speculate about why state transformation succeeded in 
ECE rather than in the FSU. Many factors may have played a role (see Wagener 
2001) among which geographical, historical, and institutional proximity to the 
European Union, or the West in general, figure prominently. The expectation to 
become member o f the EU in due time served as a transformation anchor for the 
political, the economic, as well as the social security system.
With respect to many institutional aspects envisaged accession to the 
Union predetermined the choices o f the transformation countries in ECE, not so 
with respect to the welfare system. However, econometric research has shown 
that a dummy variable "Europe" is positively correlated with the share o f 
government expenditure in GNP (Barbone and Polackova 1996; Fakin and 
Crombrugghe 1997) reflecting a particular European welfare culture. Indeed, 
there is a general commitment o f the EU to social security, but the 
"responsibility for organizing and financing o f social protection systems is in the 
hands o f Member States" (Commission 1999). This statement refers to the great 
variety o f welfare systems within the Union and their deep political-historical 
entrenchment which makes even marginal reforms a very difficult and often 
impossible endeavour. For the transformation countries it implies that they may 
choose between different models o f welfare systems. Liberal reform advisers are 




























































































East-Asian experiences: high government, in particular high welfare,
expenditures are considered a threat to economic growth (Sachs 1996). When 
social expenditure is disentangled from capital expenditure and government 
consumption, however, only the latter can be connected with negative growth 
effects while the two former improve the growth prospects (Easterly and Rebelo 
1993). Nor does the growth record o f the successful transformation countries in 
ECE, which have rather developed "European" welfare systems, corroborate the 
hypothesis.
It has become customary to distinguish with Esping-Andersen (1990) 
three worlds o f capitalist welfare systems the criteria being the commodity 
character o f labour, the matrix o f social equity (stratification vs. equalisation), 
and the public-private welfare mix:
♦  the liberal model which tries to avoid poverty by a minimal safety 
net and leaves the rest to private responsibility and initiative - the 
prominent example are the US with a share o f public social security 
and health expenditures in GDP o f 14.6 per cent in 1990,
♦  the conservative-corporatist model which adheres to the 
contribution-related benefit criterion o f mandatory insurance-type 
regimes and subsidiarity between family, firm, and the state - 
Germany’ s Rhenanian model is a typical example: public social 
security and health measures took 23.5 per cent o f GDP in 1990,
♦  the social-democratic welfare state which guarantees social 
citizenship rights and adheres to the redistributive ability-to-pay 
criterion - Sweden is the best known example with 33.1 per cent of 
her GDP devoted in 1990 to public social security and health 
expenditures (Esping-Andersen 1996: 11).
As always with ideal-type distinctions, borderlines between systems are more 
fuzzy in reality. But the size o f the three mentioned welfare states testifies to 
significant differences.
It was generally expected that the transformation countries in ECE, at 
least their political parties with leftist inclinations, would be attracted by the 
Scandinavian model o f the welfare state. On the other hand, liberal reformers 
and some o f their western advisers were enchanted by Margret Thatcher’ s, or 
her favourite social philosopher Friedrich von Hayek’ s, anti-welfare state 
rhetoric. Vaclav Klaus’ dictum o f a market economy without adjectives, in 
particular the adjective "social", became notorious. Not without surprise it was 
found that neither the one nor the other could be traced back in the political 
practice o f the transformation countries. The liberal rhetoric has not led to 




























































































sometimes claimed (Gotting 1998: 170) - the difference between rhetoric and 
practice has been dubbed the "Klaus-paradox" and adequately explained as a 
political compromise by Muller (1999: 137-9). Nor did the enlightened left in 
ECE - the orthodox communist left in Russia and Czechoslovakia insisted on the 
old socialist model - propagate the social-democratic welfare state model. It 
seemed too close to the old model, it was unsustainable in the economic 
situation o f the transition countries, it did not conform to the market system 
which was the primary objective o f transformation, and it seemed to be in a 
crisis in its countries o f origin - such were some o f the objections in the region 
(see Gedeon 1995, Gotting 1998: 84-8, Cook, Orenstein, Rueschemeyer 1999). 
So what was then the guiding line? "Add Beveridge-style minimums to a 
fundamentally social insurance-based welfare system, and you have the social 
market model pushed by the left in contemporary post communist Europe" 
(Cook, Orenstein, Rueschemeyer 1999: 343). With a somewhat stronger 
emphasis upon the state welfare system, such was also the result o f the first 
transformation phase. It is a clear result o f path dependency: the Bismarckian 
social insurance model was predominant in the region before the communist 
take-over, and the state welfare system is characteristic o f the communist 
system, as we saw.
The first step in welfare system transformation was a partial return to the 
pre-war regime: a re-institution o f the Bismarckian social insurance which 
formally, but not materially, had survived in some countries under the 
communist regime. Such reforms were distributed over the whole ten year 
period o f the 1990s: Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for instance, re-introduced 
health insurance funds at the beginning o f the decennium, in Poland a similar 
reform became effective as o f January 1, 1999. The Bismarckian model is less 
redistribution and more contribution related, while the public still expected a 
broad protection against risks, an expectation which was honoured by writing 
basic social rights into the new constitutions. This was a major achievement 
compared to the communist regime: linking the welfare state with the rule o f 
law and giving thus the constitutional courts a say in social policy. O f course, 
the adapted system came quite close to the continental conservative-corporatist 
model. It may be questioned whether the choice was made deliberately to 
accommodate the median voter (ibid.) or whether it was the rather ad hoc and 
often contradictory result o f some fiscal specialists’ efforts to keep the social 
security system going under the new conditions (Ringold 1999).
Most countries formally succeeded in separating the social security funds 
from the state budget proper, not necessarily with an own legal status and self­
administration, and separating the pension funds from health care insurance. Yet 
the weak level o f contributions due to unemployment, shadow activities, and 




























































































constituted a considerable burden to the state budget which had to cover the 
deficit by subsidies. If not the communist welfare state was premature living 
above its means, the post-communist welfare state certainly was. In Poland, the 
most extreme case, the share o f social expenditure in GDP increased from 17 per 
cent in 1989 to 32 per cent in 1995. Less dramatic increases happened in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia (ibid.: 30). These increases are mainly 
due to unemployment and pension benefits. The share o f the latter in GDP 
increased in the indicated period in Poland from 6.6. to 14.6 per cent, in the 
Czech Republic from 8.3 to 9.1 per cent, and in Hungary from 9.1 to 10.6 per 
cent (Schrooten, Smeeding, Wagner 1999: 282). The reasons for such a short 
term rise were o f course not demographic, but policy related. The shares o f 
health and education increased between 1990 and 1993 in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic and then diminished in the first and stabilised in the second 
country. In Poland it remained more or less constant on a somewhat lower level 
(EBRD 1999; most other transformation countries do not show relevant data). 
According to another estimate (Mihalyi, Petru 1999: 28), the share o f health care 
expenditure in GNP went up by almost 3 percentage points in the Czech 
Republic after 1992, while in Hungary it decreased by 2 1/2 percentage points. 
In both these countries this share was significantly higher than in Poland where 
the old tax financed and state run health care system remained in force till the 
end o f 1998. Needless to stress that the situation in FSU countries, notably 
Russia, the Ukraine, and Moldova, was completely different.
It would be wrong to state that the health and education systems remained 
more or less unaltered meaning poor in general. The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia, and recently Poland introduced mandatory health insurance systems 
and started to decentralise and partly privatise provision o f health services 
which, however, is still predominantly a state or communal affair. But the 
quality o f services, here as in education, depends on capital and labour. The 
former is urgently needed for a thorough re-equipment, the latter was 
notoriously underpaid under the old system. Given the fact that the share of 
health care expenditure in GNP is with slightly above 8 per cent in Hungary and 
the Czech Republic (Mihalyi, Petru 1999) on a Western level, the problem 
appears to be less one o f additional means than o f a fundamental restructuring o f 
the sector. In Poland the system seems to be underfinanced, as stated. Again we 
notice a huge difference in the health status o f the population between the FSU, 
where the state literally collapsed, and ECE where the situation did not improve 
significantly, but was more or less stabilised (Goldstein 1996). One reaction to 
this state o f affairs is a creeping privatisation and commercialisation o f health 
services: the more deficient the services, the sooner the general public, or those 
strata who can afford it, is willing to finance privately proper treatment. This 
happens from Poland to Bulgaria and, naturally, in Russia. The mounting costs 




























































































unemployment, indexing (to rising prices, not to falling real wages), and policy 
pressures are prominent. The differences within the region are considerable. So 
the relative income position o f pensioners during the period 1987-8 and 1992-3 
improved in Poland and Slovenia, it remained more or less unchanged in 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, and it deteriorated in the Baltics, Bulgaria, 
and the Czech Republic (Getting 1998: 178).The problem o f ageing could have 
no impact in so short a period, but will, o f course, make itself felt in the future. 
In short: there are several motives, mainly fiscal and systemic, not to go on 
muddling through, but to enter the second phase o f transformation by reforming 
the welfare state starting with the pension system.
4. Second Phase Reforms o f the Pension System
Fiscal and systemic problems with the welfare state, especially in the context o f 
an ageing society, is nothing unique to ECE. Similar questions are a hot issue 
also in the member states o f the EU and elsewhere. The naive outside observer 
would presume that, given the stage o f development and o f political and social 
culture o f the Union, the member states have found solutions that are superior to 
the received Anglo-American, continental, or Scandinavian models and that 
could be imitated by the young democratic market economies in the East. 
Nothing could be more erroneous. The received welfare state systems o f the 
West exhibit a remarkable tenacity which may be due to the fact that they are 
the result o f a long and fierce social struggle in the past and that the present 
political systems which have to agree about reforms are highly complex and 
delicately equilibrated matrices o f interests - less friendly critics speak o f Euro­
sclerosis - to the effect that changes happen, as a rule, in the margin, but that 
radical system transformations are rather hard to achieve. The Union itself has 
very little competence and leverage to develop and impose own ideas about 
social security, as mentioned already. The Treaty o f Amsterdam (art. 136 and 
137) makes it very clear that national preferences are to be observed and that 
each member has a right o f veto in this field.
The situation is quite different in the so-called emerging markets to which 
belong also the transition countries. And there is an international institution with 
outspoken ideas about the welfare system and with considerable leverage to 
make itself heard in these countries, the World Bank. The characteristics o f the 
pension system favoured in the environment o f the World Bank (World Bank 
1994) follow from the so-called Washington consensus (Williamson 1990) 
which is based upon fiscal stabilisation, regulative liberalisation, and 
organisational privatisation - the very objectives o f transformation in ECE. It 
should be mentioned that the Washington consensus does not contain 
recommendations with respect to social security, either because there was no 




























































































time. Nevertheless fiscal stabilisation, regulative liberalisation, and 
organisational privatisation are clearly the theoretical basis o f World Bank 
institutional policy recommendations. For the pension system this implies a 
three-pillar model (see Muller 1999: 27) with a minimal poverty-targeted first 
pillar on a pay-as-you-go (PA YG ) basis, a mandatory private insurance second 
pillar on a fully funded (FF) basis, and a voluntary private insurance third pillar. 
The difference with the prevailing European systems is to be seen in the shift 
from the first to the second pillar - privatisation and an individually contribution 
related scheme where the arrangement can be personal or occupational. Upon 
closer inspection we see that the stress is lying on privatisation. For the 
venerable Bismarckian model (which seems never to have been fully understood 
by the Washington advisers who confound it with the Beveridgian welfare state) 
was, if not perfectly, individually contribution related and it was fully funded. 
However two spells o f high inflation in 20th century Germany have diluted the 
funds (and shown the dangers o f such a system if it is not backed-up by the 
state) so that it could not be practised while still formally in force (up to 1957). 
The objective o f the World Bank model is not only old age income security, but 
enhanced economic growth (see its subtitle "Policies to Protect the Old and 
Promote Growth", World Bank 1994). It is assumed that funded systems will 
produce a higher savings rate than PAYG-schemes and that funds accumulated 
in private insurance companies will play a more active role in the capital market 
than funds accumulated in a public pension system. From this follow the logic 
and the dilemma o f the model: emerging markets need capital for growth, but 
their capital markets, and their financial stability in general, are poorly 
developed and very sensitive. However, the idea o f combining old age security 
and increased capital accumulation must be attractive in the transition countries 
that are eager to catch up with the European Union.
A radical implementation o f this "new pension orthodoxy" (Muller 1999: 
29, the term originally derives from Lo Vuolo 1996), as it happened 1981 in 
Pinochet’ s Chile, would imply almost a return to the pre-welfare-state world 
with individual responsibility and poor laws were it not for the mandatory 
character o f the private insurance. It would not correspond with the, at least in 
Europe, evolved idea that exactly in the context o f long term welfare protection 
individual decision making and the market need some subsidiary state support, 
nor with the European social security culture containing a strong element o f 
solidarity, nor can it be taken for sure that a system relying almost exclusively 
upon the capital market is able to provide the hoped for long term income 
security. On the other hand, a reconsideration o f the public-private mix is 
deemed necessary in many countries and "three-pillar" models are discussed and 
adopted all over the world. It was particularly Argentina which succeeded in 
1994 to transform its state-dominated pension system by a democratic decision 




























































































analyse the merits and demerits o f PAYG  and FF systems, o f their possible 
combinations, and o f their introduction or reform. Suffice it to say that also the 
EU-Commission (1999b: 13) is recommending an "appropriate balance between 
funded and PAYG  (pay-as-you-go) systems". The Commission is motivated in 
this by its concern for macro-stability withing the EMU and for more 
employment-friendly flexibility in the labour market. Both these motives must 
play a decisive role in Eastern European pension reform considerations.
The first phase pension system reforms in ECE had achieved a certain 
formal, although not financial, separation of pension schemes from the state 
budget (with the exception o f the Czech Republic whose pension system was in 
surplus which was gladly used by the state budget), the (re-)introduction o f 
employee contributions, some kind o f indexation arrangements, and some basic 
parameter changes (replacement rates, e.g.). The second phase pension system 
reforms can be grouped in three clusters (for the following see Muller 2000):
♦  Parametric changes o f the existing PAYG-system.
♦  Notional defined contribution schemes.
♦  Mandatory fully funded schemes.
Parametric changes o f a PAYG-system can imply very different things. In most 
parts o f Western Europe it means, up to now, a tinkering with replacement rates, 
the pension formula, or the retirement age. A ll this is done in ECE too. But 
when the change implies a switch from a Beveridge-type tax-financed general 
fixed pension to a Bismarck-type contribution-financed and contribution related 
pension, we may speak o f a more radical change. The problems o f such a 
transition are financial. For the first scheme was strongly redistributive, while 
the latter is meant to be less so. However, if  the flat rate pension was close to the 
subsistence minimum, which as a rule it was in the whole region, a contribution 
related differentiation o f retirement benefits requires additional funds.
Notional defined contribution (NDC) schemes are, in fact, a radical 
paradigm shift within the public pensions system that loses by this change much 
o f its PAYG  character. The basic idea is rather simple: each employee has an 
own capital account with the public social security system where the 
contribution on her behalf, be they employers1 or employees1 or other 
contributions, are registered. Let well, these individual capital accounts are 
notional, no real funded accumulation takes place. At the end o f the working 
career, the accumulated notional capital together with the statistical life 
expectancy define the actuarially fair pension benefits. The system has several 
advantages: it is contribution related, its claims can be carried with over state 
borders by employees, and the risk o f demographic changes is not laid down 




























































































ageing many people consider it an advantage). This innovation was developed 
by Swedish pension specialists and pioneered with the help o f Swedish advisers 
in Latvia in 1996, before it also became a core element o f the Swedish pension 
system reform passed by parliament in 1998 that up to now is the only far- 
reaching reform within EU member states. The new Swedish system can be 
called a four-pillar-system with a tax-financed (and means tested) minimum 
pension, a public tier along the lines o f the NDC principle, a mandatory private 
FF tier, and voluntary private provisions. Although this model may gain 
paradigmatic character in the future, its introduction was greatly helped by 
special Swedish circumstances that will not prevail everywhere. By considering 
the introduction o f a mandatory private FF tier, the present German government 
is also heading for a four-pillar-system: poverty relief by social assistance is a 
communal responsibility, the core institution is a public PAYG  insurance 
scheme that is meant to be supplemented by a mandatory private FF tier, and the 
system is rounded o ff by voluntary private provisions.
The introduction o f mandatory fully funded schemes in Eastern Europe is 
a very special case o f institutional transfer. For unlike many other instances 
where the acquis communautaire has shaped the paradigm for transformation 
targets, in this case the transfer happens from Latin America to Eastern Europe 
not without, it has to be mentioned, intermediation and support o f the World 
Bank. As said, there is no acquis communautaire with respect to pension 
schemes in the EU and the member states are themselves confronted with the 
task to reform their old age provisions due to demographic, fiscal, and market 
related reasons. It turns out, contrary to received opinions in political science 
(Bonker 2001), that compared to old democracies in Western Europe the new 
democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe encounter less resistance 
from entrenched interests when deciding and implementing radical reforms. O f 
course, the Danish population, for instance, which enjoys the most 
comprehensive tax financed public pension scheme, lives under the impression 
that they have a lot to lose in any reform and so will resist it. Resistance to 
reform is moderate in ECE (see Greskovits 1998, according to whom this may 
be due to precisely the existing welfare state) and does not impede some radical 
changes which may still be associated with the general expectation o f the 
"period o f extraordinary politics" (Balcerowicz) that there is a lot to be gained 
by transformation.
The most radical reform in transition countries has been introduced 1998 
in Kazakhstan following the Chilean precedent. We will leave the whole CIS 
region aside here. It is full o f problems o f its own not the least being serious 
payment arrears and, consequently, wide-spread poverty among the aged. Such 
problems are not solved by radical privatisation. O f more interest are the 




























































































combining a PAYG  tier with a mandatory fully funded insurance. The 
Hungarian reform went into force in 1998. Actually it yields a four pillar system 
which, as we see, seems to become the rule in Europe. It supplements the 
dominant and still to be reformed public PAYG-system with a mandatory 
private insurance tier. At the low end there is a means tested minimum pension, 
and at the high end a voluntary "third" pillar. The difference between mandatory 
private pension funds and voluntary insurance contracts can be seen, here as 
elsewhere, in the scope o f prudent regulation. O f course, the whole financial 
sector o f banks and insurance companies is carefully regulated and supervised 
by the state in well functioning market economies. Legislating mandatory 
private pension funds gives the state a special responsibility to guarantee 
solvability and liquidity which it will fulfil by additional prudent regulation. 
Here we can establish one o f the core features o f welfare state privatisation: the 
state partly retreats from own provisions transferring the production o f services 
to competing private enterprises which are, however, carefully regulated and 
controlled to protect their clients. For the risks o f the market and o f market 
failure (bankruptcy, adverse selection, moral hazard, the latter two playing an 
even more important role in health insurance) cannot be borne by the individual 
citizen. Elements o f redistributive solidarity which are implicitly present in 
welfare state arrangements will only in exceptional cases be taken over by the 
private providers. They will have to be made explicit and organised in targeted 
state measures.
In Poland the new system came into force in 1999. The first public tier 
underwent in itself a thorough reform: its organisation, the ZUS which also 
covers disability, sickness, and accident risks, was separated from the state and 
got an own legal status, it is financed by employers* and employees* 
contributions, and it pays benefits according to the notional defined contribution 
principle. It is supplemented by a minimum pension which may be seen as pillar 
o f its own in order to avoid poverty among the aged. The second pillar is a 
mandatory fully funded tier managed by strictly regulated private pension funds. 
It is financed only by employee^ contributions and, naturally, disburses 
contribution defined benefits. The third pillar, as everywhere, are voluntary 
individual old age provisions. Contrary to the Argentine model, membership o f 
the second tier is not optional in Poland (except for the transitory period and 
people o f intermediate age). In the final state, each employee will pay 
contributions into and obtain benefits from both sources. According to present 
legislation, the first public PAYG-tier is dominant. Indeed, resemblance with the 





























































































The transition to a new pension system is a lengthy and costly affair, since 
notional as well as real funds have to be accumulated and benefits must be paid 
in the meantime. So it is not to be expected that the state budget will encounter 
any appreciable relief o f the welfare state expenses in the short run. In addition, 
transitory arrangements, the details o f which we have omitted in this brief 
overview, will be and, in the countries that took already the reform steps, are 
rather complicated and difficult to grasp for the general public. Secondly, these 
reforms put a heavy burden on the administration: administering those transitory 
arrangements, administering NDC accounts, and implementing prudent 
regulation require experienced personal and expensive equipment. Thirdly, 
private pension funds will flourish only in the environment o f strong and stable 
capital markets. It remains to be seen how Hungary and Poland, and their 
followers Bulgaria, Latvia, Croatia, and Macedonia, will get along with these 
problems. It is not purely imaginary to fear that Kornai's dictum o f a premature 
welfare state in the end comes true in a premature radical welfare state reform.
5. Welfare State Accession Problems?
Since in the field o f social protection the Union has not developed a voluminous 
acquis, the starting hypothesis will be that there are little problems in this 
respect for the ECE countries to become member. Just to follow the previous 
paragraph, any type o f pension scheme ought to be acceptable for the EU in 
view o f the differences between the new Swedish, the Danish, the German, or 
the British systems. O f course, the Commission must be concerned about the 
free movement o f capital, labour, and services within the single market. An here 
the diversity o f pension systems, as well as health care systems, forms a major 
impediment to labour mobility. Clearly, non-harmonised regulations o f state 
organised PAYG  pensions schemes and o f public as well as private health care 
provisions make it unattractive for labour to move freely between member 
states. A  second concern o f the Commission is fiscal stability and with it the 
stability o f EMU. Intergenerational solidarity in PAYG  systems draws a cheque 
on the future which may become expensive when demographic parameters are 
changing as they are right now for most European countries. The temptation 
must be great for governments to postpone part o f the additional burden to a 
more distant future by issuing bonds. In that case member states with smaller 
such liabilities, like the UK, will have to share in the consequences o f cet.par. 
increasing capital costs (Ross 1999). A ll these are general problems, nothing 
specific to the new candidate members.
We have seen that fiscal crisis has induced several o f the transformation 
countries in ECE to engage in radical welfare state reforms. In that they are 
ahead o f many incumbent member state that complains about the heavy burden 




























































































follow different welfare state paradigms. It is, however, intriguing to consider 
that particular radically reformed welfare state regimes will gain a certain 
weight after Eastern enlargement within the Union influencing the institutional 
policy choice o f reform late comers. As far as third pillar private social 
insurances are concerned, which in the form o f occupational welfare provisions 
play an important role in many Western countries, the Union endeavours to 
become more active to accomplish the single market in the field o f services 
(Commission 1999a). But also in this case national sovereignty is involved very 
soon. The points o f concern are prudential rules for supplementary pensions 
schemes, coordination o f tax systems, and the influence on social partners to 
negotiate schemes that do not inhibit labour mobility. Occupational schemes 
play a minor role in ECE, partly due to the traditional overall state responsibility 
for social security, partly due to the low degree o f organisation o f social partners 
after the switch to the market order.
There could be seen an accession problem, and in some member countries 
it is seen as a veritable menace, in the fact that all membership candidates are 
poorer, in the majority o f cases considerably poorer, than the least developed 
country o f the EU-15. The expected consequence is migration from the poor to 
the rich countries. As far as such migration is wage induced, there is little wrong 
with it from an economic point o f view. However, i f  migration is induced by 
differences in welfare provisions, things become more difficult. Differences that 
are linked to labour contribution and income, as in contribution related private 
insurance schemes, again pose little problem from an economic point o f view, 
although the possibility o f moral hazard in health care insurance cannot be 
excluded. As soon as welfare systems with strong redistributive elements are 
concerned, it depends very much o f the concrete arrangement whether the 
resulting migration implies an inefficient allocation o f labour or not. Reforms 
introducing NDC and FF schemes go into the right direction, but also the 
existing systems can cope with the problem.
Two popular catch words in this context are "welfare state tourism" and 
"social dumping". Both are suggestive and essentially wrong in their 
implications. For the freedom o f labour mobility relates to the employed and not 
to the unemployed. The employed, however, will gain with their labour 
contribution claims that are not only paid out as take-home wage, but also in the 
form o f social security benefits. These claims are backed-up by the workers* 
productivity which is higher in capital intensive high developed countries than 
in labour intensive less developed countries. The term social dumping implies a 
deliberately low social security standard in order to gain a competitive edge. As 
long as the labour market is not completely rigid, lower non-wage labour costs 
will be compensated by higher wage labour costs. The distribution o f firm 




























































































labour cost is not. Interestingly, the reproach o f social dumping is always 
directed towards low labour cost countries, not high wage countries like the US 
or Japan which have significantly less developed welfare states than Europe. 
They are rather used as paragons o f "reasonable" welfare state regimes by liberal 
critics o f the European paradigm. Within the EU there is a particular practice 
that may be subsumed under social dumping, namely importing workers from 
low wage member states (which, under normal conditions as just stated, must 
be due to lower productivity and not to lower social security contributions) and 
paying them partly or fully in their home countries. Trade unions consider it as 
unfair competition. After the accession o f extremely low wage countries, such 
practices may become an even more serious problem. Clearly, harmonisation o f 
social security payments would not solve it.
We come to the conclusion that the divergence o f social security 
arrangements within the Union may have negative effects upon the mobility o f 
labour. This state o f affairs will not be significantly deteriorated when new 
members from ECE join the club. The enormous difference in total per capita 
welfare between the Union average, and even the least developed incumbent 
member states, and the accession candidates poses serious problems and strains 
on their neighbouring countries and on the Union budget. The following 
statement, however, seems unwarranted to me: "The European Union therefore 
faces a challenging task to harmonize its differing social security systems before 
it expands eastward" (Schneider 1999: 142). Ironically, it has been made by a 
Czech scholar. I f  taken seriously, it would postpone the enlargement for an 
indefinite period.
6. Conclusions
Capitalism is all about efficiency, communism was all about distribution. I f  this 
were right, transformation would be about getting from the welfare state to the 
nightwatchman state. And observers o f the social consequences o f 
transformation were justified in ascribing the undeniable deterioration o f the 
social situation in Eastern Europe to the transition from one evil to another. Yet 
things are a bit more complicated. The liberal policies o f stabilisation, 
liberalisation, and privatisation that are indispensable in order to introduce a 
market order do not imply the neo-liberal spectre o f an overall abolition o f the 
welfare state. No such thing happened in the region. What happened in part o f 
the region was state collapse. And therefore one has to differentiate carefully 
between ECE and the FSU. All the horror stories about transformation induced 
excessive alcoholism, falling life expectancy, deteriorating health status, 
appalling income inequalities are true for the CIS region, in particular Russia, 




























































































Baltics have been hit more by such evils than the four Visegrad countries and 
Slovenia (and also Croatia). That is, those countries where transformation was 
carried out swiftly and with determination witnessed the strongest economic 
upturn and had to suffer least from the social consequences. And only these 
countries will be able to fulfil the accession conditions o f the EU.
Taken literally, the communist welfare state is a contradictio in terminis 
since there was no autonomous economic system whose way o f functioning and 
results would have to be altered, complemented, or supported by the use o f 
political power. Under communism political power is all-pervasive: Lenin's 
primacy o f politics. The re-introduction o f the market fundamentally changed 
the role o f the firm and this implied a concomitant change o f the social security 
system. The latter change, in fact, did not keep pace with the former and thus 
caused the immediate deterioration o f the social situation. The first phase o f 
welfare state reform can be described as a kind o f muddling through trying to 
avoid the worst and to adapt the institutions that were inherited from the past to 
the immediate requirements o f transformation. In many cases this kind o f 
muddling through ran into fiscal problems and induced the second phase o f 
welfare state reform.
Health care and education pose even more intricate problems than old age, 
invalidity, and unemployment income security. For there is not only a necessity 
to re-organise the financial provisions o f these systems reconsidering also here 
the public-private mix. But being sectors o f production, their achievements 
depend on capital equipment and labour resources. The latter have been 
inherited in ample quantity from the old system making restructuring a 
necessity. The legacies with respect to the former are rather poor. So the 
improvement o f both sectors will be achieved only over a longer and costly 
investment period. Expenses for health care and education in the ten accession 
candidates in ECE as share o f GNP are only about 10 per cent lower than in the 
EU-15 on average (EBRD 1999) which, given the fact that GNP (at purchasing 
power parities) is on average only 40 per cent o f the EU average, implies o f 
course a considerable lower absolute level that is, however, partly compensated 
by the lower labour costs.
Only when the new economic order was more or less established, some 
countries entered a second phase o f welfare state transformation in which more 
consistent models were developed. The political economy o f this process is 
interesting in itself (see Muller 1999).The willingness to reform, stronger for 
instance in Poland and Hungary than in the Czech Republic, can be explained by 
a welfare state crisis and, above all, by a fiscal crisis thus reducing the possible 
influence o f different shared ideas about social security. Political legacies from 




























































































determine its direction. Having been part o f  the European welfare state tradition, 
in particular its Central European variant, these countries were not prepared to 
take over the World Bank model without alteration. The public-private mix o f 
the new pension models in ECE and, as we saw, also in Sweden (Germany has a 
similar reform in the making) differs significantly from the World Bank advice 
in whose three-pillar model the brunt o f social security costs is borne by the 
private second pillar, the public first pillar providing only for poor relief. The 
new European four-pillar model uses the mandatory fully funded private pillar 
as a complement, not a substitute for public social security. So it will in the end 
be the state, as legislator, regulator, and organiser, who remains responsible for 
the quality and legitimacy o f  welfare state transformation: "state capacity is 
probably the single greatest determinant o f the ability to create and manage a 
welfare state" (Orenstein 1999: 10). And good governance is the single greatest 
problem o f the transformation countries in Eastern Europe.
Hans-Jürgen Wagener
Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies 
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